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When we find an archaeological network, how can we explore the necessary versus contingent processes at 
play in the formation of that archaeological network? Given a set of circumstances or processes, what other possible 
network shapes could have emerged? This is the problem of equifinality, where many different means could 
potentially arrive at the same end result: the networks that we observe.  
This paper outlines how agent-based modeling can be used as a laboratory for exploring different processes 
of archaeological network formation. We begin by describing our best guess about how the (ancient) world worked, 
given our target materials (here, the networks of production and patronage surrounding the Roman brick industry in 
the hinterland of Rome). We then develop an agent-based model of the Roman extractive economy which generates 
various kinds of networks under various assumptions about how that economy works. The rules of the simulation are 
built upon the work of Bang (2006; 2008) who describes a model of the Roman economy which he calls the ‘imperial 
Bazaar’. The agents are allowed to interact, and the investigators compare the kinds of networks this description 
generates over an entire landscape of economic possibilities. By rigorously exploring this landscape, and comparing 
the resultant networks with those observed in the archaeological materials, the investigators will be able to employ the 
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Introduction 
This paper explores what the economist Lea Tesfatsion calls ‘agent-based computational economics’ (2013) 
in order to explore ideas concerning network formation in archaeological materials. Networks are everywhere. They 
can be discerned on a variety of bases, whether the relationships are similarity of artistic motif, geographical 
proximity, or indeed, social networks as recorded in epigraphic materials. Revisiting data first published in Graham 
2006a, we draw out a network of production surrounding Roman brick and tile in the Tiber Valley, based on 
archaeometric and survey data. This method of making connections between the bricks depends on mapping out the 
relationships of ‘same’ and ‘different’ along three axes (find spot, ceramic fabric, and stamp type) for every brick in 
our study. The information in the stamp types themselves is multidimensional, carrying information concerning the 
estate on which the brick was made, the brick maker, the landowner, and the year, and so we can draw out a parallel 
network based solely on the epigraphic and prosopographic data. We recast this network into single mode networks of 
individuals by period. We then simulate a hypothesis about the genesis of that network in order to test whether the 
hypothesis is credible. 
In the archaeological literature, while there is some discussion of the methodological and theoretical 
problems of discerning these relationships, comparatively little discussion is given over to the problem of sample 
representativeness (see Brughmans’ review of archaeological networks analysis, 2012); in effect, whatever network 
we find in the archaeological material is a sample of one. Any resulting explanation of the formation process(es) of 
that network runs the risk therefore of being a ‘just-so’ story. How can we explore the necessary versus the contingent 
processes at play in the formation of our archaeological networks? What other possible networks could have been 
generated, given a particular set of underlying social or economic processes? This is the problem of multifinality, at 
odds with equifinality or under-determination: that many different means could potentially arrive at the same end 
result, the networks that we observe. However, we can narrow down the field through agent-based modeling, by 
simulating the stories we tell about the past, to generate potential networks against which we may then measure our 
observed networks. This heuristic approach is also advocated by Luke Premo, who writes, ‘[agent based models] 
allow us to see when conventional assumptions lead to implausible outcomes or when they are unnecessary to explain 
observed phenomena” (Premo 2006, p. 92). Equifinality is thus an important concept when assessing the degree of 
uncertainty different explanations about the past may hold. (Brughmans et al. 2013 have described an alternative 
approach to the same problem, using exponential random graph models of networks. In this approach, random graphs 
with the same number of nodes and the same kinds of connections between them, given the kind of network under 
consideration, are generated to develop a probabilistic sense of the degree of representativeness of the actual observed 
graph, though the method says little about the actual underlying human processes that result or are facilitated by 
networks). 
After drawing out our networks, we use the Netlogo agent-based modeling platform (Wilensky 1999) to 
implement a (necessarily) simplified Roman economy. The model generates social networks which can then be 
measured against our known archaeological networks; where there is a degree of congruence, we argue that the model 
has vetted a credible hypothesis; where there is incongruence, the model is an inadequate explanation of the historical 
evidence. In this regard, what we are building is a ‘computational laboratory’ that takes place in an explicitly spatial 
environment (Dibble 2006; Premo 2006 calls agent based models ‘behavioral laboratories’). In the spirit of open 
access, we make the model and its code available for experimentation and extension. The results presented here should 
be seen as necessarily preliminary. 
 
Modeling the Roman Bazaar 
Ideas about the Roman economy tend to clump in either the ‘primitivist’ or ‘modernist’ camps (the 
historiography is usefully covered and dissected throughout Scheidel 2012).Recently, Peter Bang put forth a model 
that self-consciously tried to transcend this discussion through cross-cultural comparison. Bang’s ideas are not without 
their critics (most trenchantly, Silver 2009; other thoughtful critiques include Morley 2010; Katsari 2010; Holleran 
2010; Kiiskinen 2009) Bang’s vision of the Roman economy is attractive for the kind of experiment we are conducting 
here because it seems operational. He seems to provide a clear description of how all the pieces fit together, such that 
we can implement it in code, and a critical component of his model is his vision of the role of networks in the 
operations of the economy.  According to Bang, the Roman economic system is best understood as a complex, 
agrarian tributary empire, of a kind similar to the Ottoman or Mughal (Bang 2006, 2008). In such states, trade and 
markets remained locally and regionally fragmented (though there could be overlapping ‘regions’ of different sizes, 
depending on the product; cf. Horden and Purcell 2000, pp. 123-172 on ‘connectivity of microregions’). This was a 
‘stable’ economic state, with its own characteristics and patterns. Bang (2006, pp. 72-79) draws attention to the 
concept of the bazaar. The bazaar was a complete social system that incorporated the small peddler with larger 
merchants, long distance trade, and a smearing of categories of role and scale. “The bazaar was notorious as a place of 
PREPRINT  |  Graham & Weingart  |  10.1007/s10816-014-9230-y 4 
 
high risk and uncertainty where bottlenecks, asymmetries and imbalances were endemic… Bazaar can be used to 
denote a stable and complex business environment characterised by uncertainty, unpredictability and local 
segmentation of markets.” (Bang 2006, p. 79) 
The bazaar emerged from the interplay of instability and fragmentation. The mechanisms developed to cope 
with these reproduced that same instability and fragmentation. Bang (2006, pp. 80-84) identifies four key mechanisms 
that did this:  
 
• small parcels of capital (to combat risk, cf. Skydsgaard 1976);  
• little homogenization of products (agricultural output and quality varied year by year, and region by 
region as Pliny discusses in Naturalis Historia 12 and 18);  
• opportunism; 
• and social networks where there is high local clustering and a few long-distance links.  
 
These are the four key ideas that we will operationalize in our agent-based model. As Bang demonstrates, 
these characteristics correspond well with the archaeology of the Roman economy and the picture we know from legal 
and other text. Bang concludes, “…the set of strategies outlined here provided a complex and resistant foundation for 
trade. But the result was to consolidate tendencies towards market segmentation where economic flows seem to run in 
separate, compartmentalised channels and networks... The bazaar, to conclude, is the model of agrarian markets we 
have been looking for.” (Bang 2006, p. 84). We make no statement here whether or not we believe Bang when he says 
this – but we can encode it and see what emerges.  
We formalize in Netlogo code our (Bang’s) ideas concerning how these networks might be formed; we then 
sweep the parameter space, the entire landscape of possible outcomes; we compare that generated landscape of the 
model against our known archaeological networks; and in the degree of conformity or disjuncture between the model 
and our observed networks we re-evaluate the stories we tell about the past, creating new models in the process. We 
will never be able to simulate perfectly the formation processes that give rise to a particular archaeological network. 
To do so would require making a map as large as the territory it is intended to describe. But we will be able to prune 
our ideas over time, iterating hermeneutically towards better and better stories about the past. 
Our model of Bang’s idea of the bazaar (2008, 2006), a computer translation of a conceptual model, and the 
role of social networks within that model should be couched in all appropriate caveats and warnings. Networks can be 
discerned and drawn out from archaeology, prosopography, and historical sources (e.g., Brughmans 2010; Manning 
2010; Ruffini 2008; Graham and Ruffini 2007; Graham 2006a). If we can align networks from the ancient evidence to 
those generated from the model’s simulation of the ancient economy, we have a powerful tool for exploring antiquity, 
for playing with different ideas about how the ancient world worked (cf. Dibble 2006). Simulations offer a powerful 
method of bridging our models and our evidence. In this paper, we develop a simple simulation that represents a 
starting point for bringing this agenda about, and explore some of its consequences.  
 
Networks of production and patronage outside Rome 
The brick industry in the hinterland of Rome began in the middle of the first century, accelerating through 
expanded production and consolidation until finally all productive lands were in the hands of the emperor by the 
beginning of the third century. Frequently the bricks were stamped with progressively more elaborate stamps; in their 
most developed second century form, they could carry the name of the brick maker (officinator), land lord (dominus), 
estate, the consular date, and a figurative (possibly heraldic) device in the centre of the stamp. Archaeometric analysis 
of a proportion of the stamped bricks held at the British School at Rome (collected during the South Etruria Survey in 
the 1960s and 70s) demonstrated that the same stamp type could be used on different clay sources, and that bricks from 
similar clay sources might carry different stamps (Graham 2006a, pp. 28-54). This means that in practice any stamped 
brick found in the landscape of the Tiber Valley is participating in a series of binary relationships of find spot, stamp, 
and fabric. Other examples of bricks with the same stamp might be found at the same site, or at different sites. The 
brick might be composed of the same clay as the other bricks in its assemblage at that site, or it might not.  
If bricks carry the same stamp, and are made of similar fabrics, the implication is that they all had a common 
origin and distribution. If the stamps are the same, but the clays are different, then the implication is that the loci of 
their production are dispersed around the landscape. If the stamps are different, but the clays are the same, the 
implication is that the same clay source was exploited by different estates. Finally, if the assemblage of stamped bricks 
at a site is composed of differing stamp types and differing clays, it suggests that the builders at that site had access to 
a wide variety of sources.  
Keeping these relationships straight requires a network analysis. In the collection of stamped bricks from the 
British School at Rome, specimens from 23 sites were subjected to archaeometric analyses, enabling us to tease apart 
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these relationships (Graham 2006a, p. 61). Any one stamped brick might participate in more than one relationship at a 
time. We assumed that no stamped brick from an earlier period was being used or reused in a later period (by ruling 
dynasty), thus we did not observe relationships between, for instance, Flavian-era bricks and Julio-Claudian-era 
bricks.  
 We took Graham’s 2006a table 4.3 and recast it as a two-mode network, where the nodes were of two types: 
individual stamped bricks and nodes representing the various kinds of ‘relationships’. That is, two stamped bricks 
might be connected to each other as per the various kinds of relationships, and for instance to a ‘common origin and 
distribution’ node. We then collapsed this network into a one-mode network where stamped bricks were connected to 
each other (within their period) and to other periods by virtue of their production mode. (While it is possible to 
calculate various metrics on a two-mode network, unless the metrics are actually designed to work with two-mode 
data the results will be meaningless, which is why it is necessary to convert a two-mode networks to two one-mode 
networks, Weingart 2011) The resulting network gives a snapshot of approximately two centuries’ worth of 
development. 
While we could present a visualization of that network, the visualization itself does not provide much 
analytic value; its statistics do though. There are 71 nodes (bricks) and 723 edges (connections between bricks of 
similar production mode). The average degree (number of bricks each other brick is connected to) of this network is 
20, the average path length 2, and the clustering co-efficient 0.784. The network statistics draw attention to the quite 
clumpy nature of the brick distribution. The question is, what kind of human process, over two centuries, could 
generate such a network with such statistics? One candidate is immediately clear, the gradual migration of landed 
estates from private into public hands and adduce the workings of the government, but the dynasts of the second 
century already had roots in the industry back in the first century. The conglomeration of land resulted from accident 
rather than design, a by-product of marriages and alliances. Herbert Bloch in 1959 argued that the uniformity of 
formulae and expression in the stamps themselves pointed to government intervention, to a top-down direction of this 
industry. In point of fact, the network as elucidated here bears some (broad but not perfect) similarity to a 
‘small-world’ network as defined by Duncan Watts (1999, p. 114). One detects a ‘small-world’ by comparing a 
network to a random graph where the number of nodes and average degree are the same. We generated 1000 random 
networks with 71 nodes and average degree of 20 using a random network generator in Netlogo. The average path 
length over these 1000 networks was 1.72, but the clustering-coefficient was 0.28. A small-world may exist when the 
average path lengths are generally the same, but the clustering-coefficient of the observed network is of an order of 
magnitude greater. We do not have a small-world, by those lights, though it is close. Why should this matter? If the 
network did have strong evidence of being a small-world, then we might begin to suggest mechanisms for how the 
network might have arose, such as spontaneous self-organization (and even then, what does that mean, in the context 
of the Roman economy?) As it is, we must look elsewhere. If we modeled our understandings of how the Roman 
extractive economy works such that we generated outputs similar to our archaeological evidence, we might have a 
basis for understanding what these various network metrics mean. 
 
The Bazaar and the New Institutional Economics 
Bang’s idea of the Roman economy as a kind of bazaar puts the emphasis on the trading institutions of the 
Roman world. This is a trend that fits into the ‘New Institutional Economics’ (NIE) of Douglass North (1990) and his 
followers (especially for antiquity as formulated by Frier and Kehoe’s 2007 chapter in the Cambridge Economic 
History of the Greco-Roman World; cf. also Bang’s 2009 review). What North proposed in his NIE was not a rejection 
of neoclassical economics, but rather a re-assessment of what rationality could mean, especially over time. Over time, 
what is most costly in any transaction is information. Working out these costs and measuring them are the roots of 
institutions (Lo Cascio 2006, p. 219, citing North 1990, p. 27).  
NIE assumes that knowledge is costly to acquire, which limits actors in their ability (or their will) to act. 
Thus, individuals tend to make ‘good enough’ decisions, that is, ones that are ‘satisficing’. They account for 
incomplete knowledge through guess work, reliance on social relationships, values and judgements that are 
necessarily incomplete (Frier and Kehoe 2007, pp. 121-122). Once a particular choice is made, further choices in the 
same direction are easier (less immediately costly) than perhaps superior alternatives. This is called ‘path dependence’ 
(Frier and Kehoe 2007, p. 137, citing North 1990). The development of the slave-based villa economy is an example, 
where the immediate profits from the system forestalled the development of a more sustainable system that promoted 
longer-term growth.  
Institutions help to regularize and promote the flow of knowledge; it was a strategy to cope with uncertainty. 
In the ancient world, the institution of the market or fair helped to overcome the problems of asymmetrical knowledge 
not through some ‘invisible hand’ setting a ‘correct’ price, but through the formation of personal networks. “[more 
important than bringing buyers and sellers together is] the network of long-term personal relationships that arise 
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within regular markets: patterns of trust and reliance based upon prior experience… cultivating these long-term 
“relational” contracts is often of more importance than obtaining the lowest price” (Frier and Kehoe 2007, p. 119) 
According to Bang, the key characteristics of a bazaar-type economy lie in poor information, fragmented 
organization, and little standardisation. Personal connections were used to obtain information and bridge the gaps 
(2008, p. 198). The participants in a bazaar market actively sought to minimize uncertainty by establishing a clientele. 
By trading with a preferred partner, the marketer is sheltered from some risk and uncertainty, but only by fostering 
particular relationships. Other possibilities might exist, but are not open to the market trader, since he is limited to 
what can be known through his own network of contacts. More generally, Bang finds it telling for instance that 
transport amphorae never lost their regional characteristics, that despite entering trading networks of long or mid 
range, they never evolved to a standard type or size. He argues that the world of Roman trade should therefore be 
modelled not as a ‘generalized market sphere’, but as a patchy, weakly integrated space where trading ‘circuits’ are 
segmented at different scales: “It was a high-risk, high transaction-cost environment” (2008, pp. 194-195). That 
sounds rather like a small-world environment. 
Despite market irregularities, imperfect knowledge, and differences in social power, the trader should not be 
seen as passive. Rather, what the NIE suggests is that despite high transaction costs creating so-called ‘market 
imperfections’, they also create different approaches, different strategies to cope with uncertainty. For Bang, the key is 
to explore social differences between actors in a market. “[The differences] show the existence of a hierarchy and thus 
of a particular social system replete with institutionalised forms of behaviour and specialisation of functions. The 
markets of traditional trade should not be seen in terms only of one of its players, the pedlar, they constituted an entire 
social universe - the bazaar’. For Bang, ‘the bazaar’ is not the quaint tourist trap of labyrinthine shops and traders, but 
rather a ‘system and hierarchy’ that includes fairs and markets, stretching from rural hinterlands to inter-urban 
exchange networks (Bang 2008, p. 197). 
Euergetism (a public benefaction of private wealth) or other investments in ‘social capital’ by merchants was 
‘sound business’. These investments helped to maintain or improve the fides of the individual, thus proving or 
signalling the honour and thus credit-worthiness of the individual (Bang 2008, p. 260). This idea accords well with 
ideas of costly signalling, an evolutionary idea where one gains prestige and status, by putting energy into conspicuous 
display (discussed in archaeological contexts in for instance Shennan 2002, pp. 224-227). Game theory experiments 
suggest that individuals are prepared to accept lower returns from individuals with a perceived higher status (Shennan 
2002, p. 225, citing Boone and Kessler 1999, p 271); the experiments also seem to suggest that individuals who invest 
in costly signalling also end up at the head of the queue for resources in times of crisis (Shennan 2002, p. 225, citing 
Boone and Kessler 1999, pp. 262-265). Shennan also draws attention to the fact that individuals who engage in costly 
signalling also must be able to ‘back up’ the display by providing benefits to the larger social group as a whole. He 
argues that their display achieves this end also by making it too expensive for other individuals to compete in the same 
game, thus cementing their role (Shennan 2002, p. 225). Thus, market activities of merchants taken as a communal 
whole turn the bazaar into a social system; for Bang, a market was also a “social universe fostering a sense of hierarchy 
and promoting norms of proper conduct between individual traders” (Bang 2008, p. 260). 
The Piazzale delle Corporazione in Ostia, the collegiae of traders in Lugdunum, the Palmyrene merchants in 
Palmyra - all of these are evidence, for Bang, of the ways traders banded together into social groups in attempts to 
mitigate the imperfect knowledge and regional vagaries of the Roman world (Bang 2008, pp. 251-253). Information 
uncertainty and unpredictability of supply and demand are the ‘ideal-typical’ characteristics of the bazaar (Bang 2008, 
p. 4). Building networks was one response to this situation. These then are the economic characteristics and social 
behaviours that we will seek to model in our computational simulation of the bazaar. Can such a simulation generate 
social differences between actors? What kinds of hierarchies can emerge? Under what conditions does this 




Agent-based modelling is an approach to simulation that focuses on the individual. In an agent-based model, 
the agents or individuals are autonomous computing objects. They are their own programmes. They are allowed to 
interact within an environment (which frequently represents some real-world physical environment). Every agent has 
the same suite of variables but each agent’s individual combination of variables is unique (if it was a simulation of an 
ice-hockey game, every agent would have a ‘speed’ variable, and an ‘ability’ variable, and so the nature of every game 
would be unique). Agents can be aware of each other and the state of the world (or their location within it), depending 
on the needs of the simulation. It is a tool to simulate how we believe a particular phenomenon worked in the past (cf. 
Gilbert and Troitzsch 2005, p. 17 on the logic of simulation; Macal and North 2010). When we simulate, we are 
interrogating our own understandings and beliefs. What is particularly valuable then is that we can build a simulation, 
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and when the agents begin to interact along the patterns of behavior that we have specified (drawn from our 
understanding of how various processes worked), we have a way of exploring the non-linear, non-intuitive, emergent 
consequences of those beliefs. In this way, we can trace what affects our hypotheses would have on the past, and test 
how well they are aligned with surviving evidence. 
What is more, in order to code a particular behavior, we have to be clear about what we think about that 
behavior. We have to make our assumptions explicit in order to translate an historical argument into code. A third 
party then can examine the code, critique these assumptions and biases (or indeed, errors) and modify the simulation 
towards a ‘better’ state. The model is built using the open-source Netlogo modeling environment and language 
(Wilensky 1999). Examples of agent-based models used for archaeological questions include Wilkinson et al. 2007; 
Graham 2009, 2006b; Graham and Steiner 2008; Premo 2006; Kohler et al. 2005; Bentley et al 2005.  
 
The Model Setup and Rules  
Our model1 is an extension of Wilensky’s Wealth Distribution model (1998) which represents a simple 
world with one resource that agents consume; because of the differential distribution of that resource across the world, 
and the limit ability of agents to know the world (to see better locations – patches, in Netlogo jargon - of resource) the 
amount the agents can collect always results in a global population where the majority of individuals have very little 
resources. (An alternative model developed for archaeology was developed in Repast by Bentley, Lake, and Shennan 
2005, which has two resources being traded at once, on predefined network topologies. The benefit of working with 
the Wilensky’s Wealth Distribution model is that it comes packaged with Netlogo, its operations are well documented 
and understood, and there is no a-priori network topology involved). The Netlogo Wealth Distribution model is a 
simple model that results in a complex phenomenon: inequality of wealth. As a general rule whilst modeling, it is 
always better to start with a simple simulation, even at the expense of fidelity to the phenomenon under consideration, 
on the grounds that it is easier to understand and interpret outputs. A simple model can always be made more complex 
when we understand what it is doing and why; a complex model is rather the inverse, its outcomes difficult to isolate 
and understand. 
Our modified and extended version of the model imagines a ‘world’ (‘game board’ would not be an 
inappropriate term) in which help is necessary to find and consume resources. The agents do not know when or where 
resources will appear or become exhausted. By accumulating resources, and ‘investing’ in improvements to make 
extraction easier, agents can accrue prestige. When agents get into ‘trouble’ (they run out of resources) they can 
examine their local area and become a ‘client’ of someone with more prestige than themselves (thus a network of 
patron-client relationships may emerge). It is an exceedingly simple simulation, but one that exhibits subtle 
complexity in its results (the original model had no communication or interaction between the agents). In this simple 
world, only one kind of resource is simulated at a time – forest, coppicing, clay, and mining/quarrying. These 
resources are chosen because of the probable use of broadly similar kinds of strategies to brick in order to organize the 
trade (Graham 2005 pp. 111-115, the use of stamps on timber and other primary resource products to organize 
extraction and distribution). There was of course a great deal of difference between these resources in terms of the 
scale of the organization by the Imperial period (cf. Meiggs 1982, pp. 325-370; Hirt 2010, pp. 357-369; for an 
agent-based simulation of mining in Bronze Age Halstatt see Kowarik et al. 2012). The model takes account of scale 
and variability by giving each point in the world a chance of holding a certain amount of whatever resource is being 
simulated (with mines being the least likely, and forests the most). In the model, forest and coppicing regenerate after 
a set amount of time, while clay pits and mines do not. Each location keeps track of how often it has been ‘harvested’, 
allowing for exhaustion or depletion of the resource (scarcity) and thus taking it out of play.  
 Each individual agent represents a single individual who works in this world. Their sole task is to locate and 
‘harvest’ the resource. Each agent consumes a portion of whatever is harvested in order to remain active. The amount 
consumed is set randomly per agent, to a user preset maximum; every individual is different in their abilities. The 
original simulation calls this ‘metabolism’; we can think of it as representing ‘transaction cost’. Individual agents also 
have knowledge of the world (which is called ‘vision’ in the model, representing how ‘far’ they can ‘see’ within the 
environment), to differing degrees (again, to a user preset maximum). We can think of this as representing Bang’s 
informational uncertainty. These two variables allow the user to simulate worlds of differing economic conditions.  
An agent searches the environment within its field of vision, looking for a resource. If it finds some, it may 
1. For the full model code and the details of its routines, please download 
http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.92953 . Open with Netlogo 5. The code itself is annotated with comments 
explaining what is happening in each procedure, and may be reviewed by clicking on the ‘Code’ button. 
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harvest it. If its costs of movement are greater than the amount of the resource it has on hand, it is removed from the 
simulation. A new agent takes its place, representing a generational change-over. If the agent has now consumed all of 
its resources, it may ask for help (and thus stave off removal). Each agent keeps track of who has given it help and to 
whom it has given help in turn, which generates a network structure that we may analyse at the conclusion of the 
simulation. 
When an agent asks for help, it examines its local neighbourhood (within its range of vision, i.e., 
knowledge-of-the-world) for a possible patron. A possible patron is one whose prestige is equal to or greater than its 
own (initially, all agents have the same prestige value; exact values are not as important as having appropriately 
conceived processes, cf. Agar 2003). If a potential patron can be found, and the potential patron accepts the other agent 
as client (determined by a roll of the die), then the patron gives the client some of its resource. This gift increases the 
patron’s prestige, and puts the client in its debt. Patrons, in the model, invest some of their resources in improving the 
yield from a location, thus representing the investment in fides. 
Thus, the network is generated by agents who have consumed all their resources. Agents with higher 
metabolisms/transaction costs are more likely to consume all their resources, and thus more likely to make 
connections. Agents with lower vision are also more likely to make connections.  
At the end of each cycle, the agents compare their resource amount against others whom they ‘know’ (who 
may be found within the agent’s ‘vision’). The simulation makes the same comparison for the population of all agents 
as a whole at the same time. The agents set their ‘prestige’ to reflect their local status into top, middle, and bottom 
thirds. Each ‘patron’ (an agent with at least two other agents in its debt) selects another patron to compete against at the 
same rank (thus local elites compete against each other). Elites compare both the quality and number of their followers 
against each other. A patron with a few wealthy clients might beat a patron with several poor ones. Winning the game 
increases prestige, losing reduces prestige. The winner then calls on its clients to support it through gifts of resources 
(while simplistic, this modeling of ‘patronage’ does not stray from the broad outlines suggested by scholars collected 
in Wallace-Hadrill 1989a. It does cancel out the limiting effect described above– one can only give what one has, and 
no more- on patrons’ ability to give).  
At the end of the simulation, each agent writes its patrons and clients into a single file for network analysis. 
The network analysis is performed using the Gephi network analysis program (Bastian et al. 2009; Kuchar 2011). 
Data on the state of the model at each time step is written to a spreadsheet, counting the number of agents who are 
patrons, clients, their degree of prestige, and their classification into high-middle-low status both locally and globally. 
This status division is calculated as in the original model, in terms of the amount of resource the agent has 
accumulated. An agent compares its amount to those in its network, for a sense of local status, and the simulation 
performs the same calculation for the population of agents as a whole, for a sense of global status. The networks that 
are generated in this model depend on status and role. Social role in the Roman world was not absolute but rather 
depended on the context of the interaction; an individual might be a patron of one individual whilst being a client of 
another. In the epigraphy of stamped bricks, one can make fairly safe deductions regarding social class and 
relationship between individuals, due to the legalistic wording of the stamp that mirrors that for contract letting. 
Patterns of patronage are thus the fossilized networks we see in the bricks.  
 
What goes in, and what comes out, of an agent-based model 
A criticism of computational simulation is that one only gets out of it what one puts in; that its results are 
tautological. This is to misunderstand what an agent-based simulation does. As Box and Draper put it, ‘all models are 
wrong, but some are useful’ (1987, p. 424). In the model developed here, we put no information into the model about 
the ‘real world’, the archaeological information against which we measure the results. Although the initial model 
instantiation was created "in a vacuum", so to speak, as a test of the suitability of Bang's formulation of the ‘Imperial 
Bazaar’, we can say that Bang's descriptive model was actually insufficiently precise to create a computational 
simulation, because we cannot take from his description the parameters of the simulation. That said, we can take his 
model and, assuming any set of parameters, ask if there is any possible world/configuration for which his description 
would be sufficient to describe the evidence. This is the point where we go from model testing to model building, and 
though it is not strictly separated from the evidence, it is the tuning of the model that can lead us from an unlikely 
hypothesis to a credible one. 
We measure whether or not this formulation, this model is correct by matching its results against 
archaeological information which was never incorporated into the agents’ rules, procedures, or starting points. We 
never pre-specify the shape of the social networks that the agents will employ; rather, we allow them to generate their 
own social networks which we then measure against those known from archaeology. This is an important point: we do 
not use the same evidence to train and validate the model. Social networks can be discerned in archaeological 
materials since artefacts are the direct result of social relationships (Knappett 2011; Coward 2010; Graham and 
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Ruffini 2007, pp. 325-331). 
Our archaeological base line for the networks comes primarily from epigraphy. Clay and timber carried 
explicit messages on them, in the form of stamps (Graham 2005). Other classes of raw materials in the Roman world 
similarly carried explicit messages on them (such as masons’ marks on marble in the quarries). These messages ranged 
from the simple name of the maker, to the name of the estate whence they came, to the year in which they were 
made/cut down/quarried. In essence, the right to extract or use the resource was arranged through locatio-conductio 
contracts, whether or not the landowner took an active stake in production, which the language of the stamps reflects 
(Steinby 1993; Setälä 1977; Helen 1975; Aubert 1994). Meiggs supposes that the same system used for letting out 
public contracts was used in managing the public forests (1982, p. 329). Hirt discusses the differences between private 
and public mines/quarries, in much the same terms (2010, pp. 84-93). 
It is possible to reconstruct something of the social networks surrounding the exploitation of materials from 
this epigraphic material. (Additionally, we can see these networks in the archeometry of brick, tile, and other objects, 
Graham 2006a, pp. 92-113; Malkin et al. 2007; for criticism of the approach see Brughmans 2010). The named 
individuals in brick stamps can be knitted together into a social network. We use network statistics generated from a 
study of the patterning of co-occurrence of names of individuals, estates, and workshops, as well as patterns of 
co-exploitation of clay bodies as the control in this study. We set the simulation to run through all combinations of its 
variables, and then match the shape of the resulting generated social networks against the archaeological ones to 
identify simulation runs of interest. 
However, the model tells us more if it fails than if it succeeds. If it fails, we know the model is insufficient to 
describe the phenomena, making this approach a type of falsification. This is a definite thing we learn: the model is 
wrong, or incomplete. If the model matches, we know it is sufficient, but we do not know that it is necessary. Model 
falsification therefore provides more certainty than model matching. That said, if we do match, we can say (at least, 
and more with supporting historical and archaeological evidence) that the model is a credible hypothesis for the 
Roman economy.  
 
Simulation Results 
We sweep the ‘parameter space’ to understand how the simulation behaves; i.e., the simulation is set to run 
multiple times with different variable settings. In this case, there are only two agent variables that we are interested in 
(having already pre-set the environment to reflect different kinds of resources). Because we are ultimately interested in 
comparing the social networks produced by the model against a known network, the number of agents is set at 235, a 
number that reflects the networks known from archaeometric and epigraphic analysis of the South Etruria Collection 
of stamped Roman bricks (Graham 2006a). 
Nine different combinations of variables are used to sweep the entire space, twice for each of the four 
resources, making for 72 different runs over nearly 60,000 iterations of the model. The simulation is set to stop at the 
arbitrary point of 50 generations (the question of when to halt an experiment is not at all obvious when it comes to 
simulation. The reader may wish to experiment with changing this; figure 1). In continuous runs of the models, we 
found that some settings had results that fluctuated persistently over time, suggesting an unstable economy or an 
incomplete model. We hope to address these issues in a follow-up, or invite the reader to download the simulation and 
improve it accordingly.). 
  
 Transaction costs (“metabolism”) 
knowledge of the world 
(“vision”) 
combination 1 Low Low 
combination 2 Low Middle 
combination 3 Low High 
combination 4 Middle Low 
combination 5 Middle Middle 
combination 6 Middle High 
combination 7 High Low 
combination 8 High Middle 
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combination 9 High High 
Table 1. Combinations of variables in the ‘sweep’ of the model’s behaviour space. 
 
[insert figure 1 about here, screenshot of Netlogo parameter settings] 
 
We should expect some basic trends to emerge. We could expect that: 
• increasing the transaction costs (Bang’s organizational fragmentation) should make it much more difficult 
for agents to survive (i.e., make the simulation reach its arbitrary end-conditions, a point where the average 
number of generations per agent equals 50) relatively quickly).  
• increasing ‘vision’ (we reduce information uncertainty by increasing the amount of the world it is possible to 
‘know’, which in both the simulation and antiquity make it easier to form the personal networks that promote 
the flow of knowledge) should make it much easier for agents to survive; that the simulation takes a relatively 
long time to reach its arbitrary end point. 
 
This is in fact what we see (Figure 2). A world where fifty generations are reached quickly might be 
characterised as unstable, while one that takes some time could be called stable. Combinations 3, 6, and 9 lead to the 
greatest peaks in stability. If one were to map these against the economic development of the Roman world, one could 
argue that combinations 9 and 6 would agree with a situation or area where many transport or communications links 
have still to be developed, though the general lay of the land is well known. Combination 3 would agree with a 
situation where the transportation or communications networks were at the most developed and secure. Either way, 
these combinations point to a degree of integration (and the differing circumstances under which integration could be 
produced, in the simulation). 
Combinations 4 and 7, the greatest dips in the graph (and thus worlds of instability), are suggestive of a 
situation where transaction costs are high and communications are poor. The question is, which of these situations 
corresponds with the ‘real’ world? We turn to the generated social networks and their comparison with archaeological 
data. 
 
Social Networks Analysis 
 Julio-Claudian Flavian Antonine Severan 
Clustering Coefficient 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.11 
Equivalent on a random 
graph 
0.008 0.005 0.02 0.08 
Average Path Length 1.16 1 3.88 2 
Equivalent on a random 
graph 
6.76 4 4.3 5 
Table 2. Network characteristics of stamped Tiber Valley bricks, based on the epigraphy of the stamps. 
Shading suggests that small-world conditions might be in evidence (same average path length as in a random graph 
although the clustering is of an order of magnitude or more higher, Watts 1999, p.114). After Graham 2006a, p. 102, 
Table 6.1 
 
The way individuals are connected carries implications for the ways in which information or other materials 
flow through that network. Network structure carries implication for the ability to act, and the ways individuals 
embedded in a network can leverage the information/material that flows through that network. Individuals and their 
positioning on the network matters. In a network, individuals’ local situations give rise to a global network whose 
dynamics emerge from this local interplay (see for instance Brughmans 2012; Coward 2010; Mitchell 2009, pp. 
227-290; Christakis and Fowler 2009; Ruffini 2008; Graham 2006c; Barabasi 2002; Watts 1999). 
One can compute metrics to understand the implications of an individual’s positioning (such as the number of 
connections, or the number of paths through the network between every pair of individuals on which this particular 
individual sits). We use the Gephi network visualization suite (Bastian et al. 2009). Here, we are concerned with 
global-level metrics rather than measurements of individual historic actors. We have chosen two commonly-used 
metrics in particular to compare the behavior of the generated networks with the ones known from archaeology and 
epigraphy (Brughmans 2012 gives an excellent overview of the statistical properties of networks and their 
archaeological implications). Future work will consider other metrics. 
• Clustering coefficient. This is a measurement that looks at how dense the connections are amongst 
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the neighbors of each individual in the network (neighbors are those to whom the individual is 
directly connected). The coefficient is the average density of all the ‘neighborhoods’ (Hanneman 
and Riddle 2005 Chapter 8).   
• Average Path Length. This is a measurement that takes the mean of the number of links between 
every pair of actor. 
Watts (1999) formally identified a network structure that appears in social (and other) systems of all kinds, 
which he called the ‘small-world’ phenomena. In a small-world, most individuals are tightly connected in small 
groups or neighborhoods; it is highly ordered. Normally, this means that it takes many steps to get from one side of the 
network to the other. Yet in a small-world network, occasionally some individuals have links that connect otherwise 
disparate parts of the network, a kind of short-circuit. This has the effect of making the entire network much ‘closer’ 
than its clustering would suggest – it looks ordered but behaves randomly.  We can tentatively identify a small-world 
then as one with a short average path length and a strong clustering coefficient, compared to a randomly connected 
network with the same number of actors and connections. Watts suggests that a small-world exists when the path 
lengths are similar but the clustering coefficient is an order of magnitude greater than in the equivalent random 
network (Watts 1999, p. 114). 
 In Roman economic history, discussions of the degree of market integration within and across the regions of 
the Empire could usefully be recast as a discussion of small-worlds. Irad Malkin’s recent A Small Greek World (2011) 
uses the idea of ‘small-worlds’ as a metaphor to explore the emergence of the Greek speaking world, but does not 
actually analyze any of the examples he provides with a network methodology, taking for granted that they must be 
small-words (2011, pp. 16-20; cf Ruffini 2012 and Brughmans 2013 on this use of ‘small-worlds’).  If small-worlds 
could be identified in the archaeology (or emerge as a consequence of a simulation of the economy), then we would 
have a powerful tool for exploring flows of power, information, and materials. Perhaps Rome’s structural growth – or 
lack thereof – could be understood in terms of the degree to which the imperial economy resembles a small-world 
network (cf. the papers in Manning and Morris 2005)? Small-worlds also seem to be a pre-requisite for 
self-organization, where complex phenomena emerge from the interaction of the constituent parts (Cilliers 1998). 
The networks generated from the study of brick stamps are of course a proxy indicator at best. Not everyone 
(presumably) who made brick stamped it. That said, there are two particular combinations of settings that produce 
results similar to those observed in stamp networks, in terms of their internal structure and the average path length 
between any two agents. In run 21, the variable settings are those for combination 3, which corresponds to a world 
where transactions costs (M) are significant (M = 10) and knowledge of the world (V) is deep (V = 20); the resource is 
‘forest’. The clustering coefficient and average path length observed for stamped bricks during the second century 
(Antonines) fall just outside the range of results for multiple runs with these settings (from 0 to 0.018 for the clustering 
coefficient; and 2 to 8 for the average path length). Small-world conditions do not seem to be fulfilled in the real-world 
network, which perhaps means that we are dealing with a form of economic activity that does not correspond to the 
bazaar. Rather than being an emergent bottom-up economy, perhaps some form of outside control is imposed. In 
which case, we need to be very careful about using ‘small-worlds’ and their consequences as a metaphor when our 
observed evidence points in other directions.  
In the second run which produces network statistics very similar to observed real-world brick networks (run 
13), the variable settings are those for combination 4, a world where transaction costs are significant (but not 
prohibitive; M = 10), and knowledge of the world is limited (V = 2); the resource is ‘forest’. The clustering coefficient 
and average path length observed for stamped bricks during the second century fall within the range of results for 
multiple runs with these settings (from 0 to 0.034 for the clustering coefficient; and 2 to 14 for the average path 
length). In the simulation, the rate at which individuals linked together into a network suggests that there was a 
constant demand for help and support. 
There were a number of runs that did not produce any clustering at all (and very little social network growth). 
Most of those runs occurred when the resource being simulated was coppiced woodland. This would suggest that the 
nature of the resource is such that social networks do not need to emerge to any great degree (for the most part, they are 
all dyadic pairs, as small groups of agents exploit the same patch of land over and over again). The implication is that 
some kinds of resources do not need to be tied into social networks to any great degree in order for them to be 
exploited successfully (these were also some of the longest model runs, another indicator of stability).  
The strongest network cohesion occurred in runs 5 (forest), 28 (mine), and 23 (clay) (table 3). Run 5 occurred 
in a combination implying a world where transaction costs were low, and knowledge of the world was middling. Run 
28 occurred in a combination implying a world where the transactions costs were great, and the knowledge of the 
world was limited. Run 23 shows a world where the transactions costs were middling, and knowledge of the world was 
deep. In each case, it is the nature of the resource that makes the difference, rather than the variable settings. The social 
network which emerges depends on the kind of resource or product involved (cf. Fant 1993 on the organization of the 
PREPRINT  |  Graham & Weingart  |  10.1007/s10816-014-9230-y 12 
 
marble trade. It may be noteworthy that the model produces results ‘by accident’ which are congruent to other 
archaeological hypotheses, but that is beyond the scope of the current study). 
 
Run 5 23 28 
Resource Forest Clay Mine 
Transaction costs (M) 1 10 25 
Knowledge of the world (V) 10 20 2 
# of Nodes 202 188 200 
# of Links 494 406 446 
Average path length 6.2 7.019 7.6 
Clustering coefficient 0.01 0.01 0.01 
% participation in the social network 86 80 85 
Table 3. Network statistics for the greatest participation rates (number of agents not isolated) 
 
Conclusion 
What are some of the implications of thinking of the Roman economy as a kind of bazaar? If, despite its 
flaws, this model correctly encapsulates something of the way the Roman economy worked, we have an idea of, and 
the ability to explore, some of the circumstances that promoted economic stability. It depends on the nature of the 
resource and the interplay with the degree of transaction costs and the agents’ knowledge of the world. In some 
situations, ‘patronage’ (as instantiated in the model) serves as a system for enabling continual extraction; in other 
situations, patronage does not seem to be a factor.   
However, with that said, none of the model runs produced networks that had the characteristics of a 
small-world. The equivalent random graphs in every case had similar clustering coefficients and similar path lengths. 
Since neither the observed networks in brick nor the networks generated by the simulation match each other or 
small-worlds, we are left with a puzzle. If we have correctly modeled the Imperial Bazaar (including how it imagines 
networks to emerge, cf. Verboven 2002 on networks of patronage as key to understanding Rome), we should have 
expected the results to match the historical/archaeological evidence. As they did not, or if there were not enough 
details in Bang’s model, then we perhaps have discovered that this idea of the Imperial Bazaar as instantiated here is 
not sufficient to describe the evidentiary record. Unrelatedly, if other researchers think that the Bazaar ought naturally 
to lead to small-worlds (and which we believe is probably true), then we know that either our operationalization of 
Bang’s model is not a good representation of a bazaar, or his model itself is inadequate. If the networks we find 
archaeologically do not seem to have small-world properties, then it is not unreasonable to suspect that there were 
more top-down economic forces that the Bazaar model would seem to allow. We can begin to explore the conundrum 
by examining the argument made in the code of the simulation, especially in the way agents search for patrons. In the 
model, it is a local search. There is no way of creating those occasionally long-distance ties. We had initially imagined 
that the differences in the individual agents’ ‘vision’ would allow some agents to have a greater ability to know more 
about the world and thus choose from a wider range. In practice, those with greater ‘vision’ were able to find the best 
patches of resources, indeed, the variability in the distribution of resources allowed these individuals to squat on what 
was locally best. Our ‘competition’ and prestige mechanisms seem to have promoted a kind of path dependence. 
Perhaps we should have instead included something like a ‘salutatio’, a way for the agents to assess patrons’ fitness or 
change patrons (Graham 2009; Garnsey and Woolf 1989, p.154; Drummond 1989, p.101; Wallace-Hadrill 1989b, pp. 
72-73). Even when models fail, their failures still throw useful light. This failure of this simulation suggests that we 
should focus on markets and fairs as not just economic mechanisms, but as social mechanisms that allow individuals 
to make the long distance links. A subsequent iteration of the model will include just this. 
 
Finally, the model runs on a torus-shaped world (that is, the left and right sides of the environment are 
connected, as are the top and bottom. If an agent wanders off the top of the screen, it re-appears at the bottom). A more 
useful model would be instantiated on top of a GIS with the real locations of various resources (and associated 
infrastructure) known. Perhaps it could be made to work with the transport economics modeled by Scheidel and 
Meeks (2012) and the ORBIS project (this interactive mapping project allows the user to explore the differences in the 
economic geography of the Roman world depending on time of year, mode of transport, and routes through the Roman 
world). 
This model will come into its own once there is more and better network data drawn from archaeological, 
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epigraphic, and historical sources. This will allow the refining of both the set-up of the model and comparanda for the 
results. The model presented here is a very simple model, with obvious faults and limitations. Nevertheless, it does 
have the virtue of forcing us to think about how patronage, resource extraction, and social networks intersected in the 
Roman economy. It produces output that can be directly measured against archaeological data, unlike most models of 
the Roman economy. When one finds fault with the model (since every model is a simplification), and with the 
assumptions coded therein, he or she is invited to download the model and to modify it to better reflect his or her 
understandings. In this way, we develop a laboratory, a petri-dish, to test our beliefs about the Roman economy. We 
offer this model in that spirit. 
  




An early exploration of this model was presented at the Land and Natural Resources in the Roman World conference 
in Brussels, May 2011. A subsequent elaboration was presented at SAA2013 in Honolulu at the Connected Past 
session. We would like to thank Paul Erdkamp, Koen Verboven, and Tom Brughmans for inviting us to participate in 
those conferences, and also the participants for their insight and criticism of these ideas, especially Fiona Coward and 
Barbara Mills. Various drafts have been seen by various people at various stages, and we thank them for their 
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Fig 1 Netlogo screenshot, setting the parameters for sweeping 
 
Fig 2The amount of time (number of model cycles) to reach a global mean of 50 generations, by combination of 
metabolism and vision against resource  
 
Table 1. Combinations of variables in the ‘sweep’ of the model’s behaviour space. 
 
Table 2. Network characteristics of stamped Tiber Valley bricks, based on the epigraphy of the stamps. Shading 
suggests that small-world conditions might be in evidence (same average path length as in a random graph although 
the clustering is of an order of magnitude or more higher, Watts 1999, p. 114). After Graham 2006a, p. 102, Table 6.1 
 
Table 3. Network statistics for the greatest participation rates (number of agents not isolated) 
 
  




This model description follows the ODD protocol developed by Grimm et al., 2006 and Grimm & Railsback, 2005. 
The model may be downloaded at http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.92953. Open with Netlogo 5. It is an elaboration of 
Wilensky’s Wealth Distribution model (1998), built using the Netlogo platform (Wilensky 1999). 
Purpose 
The purpose of this model is to explore network formation under the conditions described by  Bang’s formulation of 
what he calls ‘the Roman Bazaar’. It focuses on the emergence of networks generated by Roman patronage (as understood in 
Bang’s model) under different economic conditions (concerning natural resources).  
State variables and scales 
In this simplified world, there is one kind of resource available for extraction and consumption at a time (forest, 
coppiced woodland, mines, and clay). Each individual agent represents the head of a single family who exploits this world. 
Each agent has a ‘metabolism’, the maximum value of which is set by the user. Every agent will have a random metabolism up 
to that maximum. This metabolism is a value indicating how much of the resource is consumed at each time-step. The other 
variable is ‘vision’, and it is set the same way. Thus the population as a whole has normally distributed values for these two 
variables, but the particular combination for a particular agent is distinct from every other agent. These two variables represent 
in a larger sense the agent’s ability to move in the world - its transport economics, if you will - and the agent’s ability to know 
about the world, to find other agents who can help it, or to find other resources. Similarly, a random life-span is set between a 
globally determined minimum and maximum.  
Each patch in the world has a chance of holding a certain amount of whatever resource is being simulated. Each 
resource regenerates after a set amount of time (forest; coppiced woodland). Mines and clay pits do not regenerate. Each patch 
in the world can hold a maximum amount of resource, and a certain amount is allowed to regenerate on each tick. The 
combination of these four variables (growth interval; amount grown; maximum allowed; percent best land) is pre-set to 
represent the four kinds of resource. 
Forest takes twice as long as coppiced wood to regenerate. Coppiced wood is more productive (and has more uses) 
than forest wood. Both wild and coppiced wood cover the same density of patches, with the highest concentrations occurring on 
4% of patches (and surrounding patches containing diffused amounts). 
Mines hold an order of magnitude more resources than clay pits, but mines are set to be very rare (1% of the patches) 
while clay pits are somewhat more common (3%). These resources do not diffuse, but are constrained to a single patch.  
Finally, each patch keeps track of how often it has been ‘harvested’, allowing for exhaustion or depletion of the 
resource and thus taking it out of play. 
Process overview and scheduling 
Resource growth 
Each patch checks to see how much resource is allowed, and examines how much it currently contains. If it is less than 
the maximum, it regenerates the allowed amount to grow. 
Harvest 
Each agent examines its local neighbourhood, and heads towards the local maximum amount of the resource (if the 
patch is exhausted, it moves on). If the amount of resource is above the mean for the world, the agent notes the number of other 
agents on the patch, and they divide the resource between them. If the amount is less than the mean for the world, the agent 
examines whether or not it is embedded in social networks. If it is embedded, it will not harvest, but rather rely on help from its 
social network to obtain resource. If it is not embedded, it will go ahead and harvest anyway. 
Move-eat-age-die 
Each agent consumes some of its resource that it is holding, and ages +1. If an agent has less resources than its 
metabolism value, or if its age has now reached beyond its life span, the agent ‘dies’ and a new agent takes its place thus 
representing a generational change-over.  
The agent however is aware that it may be in peril. If the agent has now consumed all of its resources, it may ask for 
help (and thus stave off ‘death’).  
Patronage (ask-for-help)  
When an agent asks for help, it examines its local neighbourhood (within its range of vision, that is, 
knowledge-of-the-world) for a possible patron. A possible patron is one whose prestige is equal to or greater than its own 
(initially, all agents have the same prestige value). If a potential patron can be found, and the potential patron accepts the other 
agent as client (determined by a roll of the die), then the patron gives the client some of its resource. This gift increases the 
patron’s prestige, and puts the client in its debt. 
Set-initial-variables 
Should an agent be unable to find help, or its age exceeds its life-span, the agent ‘regenerates’. Its generation is set +1, 
and its metabolism is reset randomly. Some of the prestige of the previous generation carries onwards. Since ‘vision’ can be 
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thought of as representing an agent’s knowledge of the world, there is an ‘educational’ function in that the richer agents are able 
to impart a greater degree of their knowledge to succeeding generations. The poorest have their vision set at random within the 
limits of the user-set maximum vision. 
Euergetism 
Patrons invest in their local area. Patrons who are in the top half of the population by prestige build 
‘super-improvements’ which magnify the resource by 50%. All other patrons improve the productivity by 10%. 
Games of patronage (compete, patron-compete, calculate-clients-worth, extract-wealth-from-clients) 
At the end of each cycle, the agents compare their resource amount both locally and globally. They set their colour to 
reflect their local status into top, middle, and bottom thirds. They do the same comparison at the global level. Each ‘patron’ (an 
agent with at least two other agents in its debt) selects another patron to compete against; the decision is made based on colour, 
i.e. wealth (thus local elites compete against other local elites; the middling sort compete against the middling sort). Elites 
compare both the quality and number of their followers against each other. A patron with a few wealthy clients might beat a 
patron with several poor ones. Winning the game increases prestige, losing reduces prestige. The winner then calls on its clients 
to support it through gifts of resources. 
Exhaustion (‘grow-settlement’) 
Every 25 cycles the patches examine how many times they’ve been harvested, and if they are in the top 1%, they 
become ‘exhausted’ and can no longer be harvested. 
Design concepts 
Emergence. – The simulation is allowed to run until the population as a whole has reached an average of 50 
generations. How quickly that end-state is reached depends on not just the resource being modelled, but also on the interplay 
between the average movement costs (metabolism) in the world, and the average ability of the agents to know the world 
(vision).  
As we sweep through the various combinations of the two variables, there are three distinct peaks and troughs in terms 
of social stability (that is, long-lived generations and thus the amount of resource they have in any given moment (whether 
obtained through direct harvest or through gift-giving) is sufficient to keep them going.  
The rate with which social networks emerge also depends on the resource being extracted, with forest growing 
linearly, while coppiced woodland and clay grow almost exponentially very quickly and then plateau for the duration, and 
mines show an initial linear growth and then slowly plateau. 
The tripartite breakdown of ‘wealth’ in the model is different when measured locally versus globally. While locally 
there can be a great deal of equality (measured as each agent reports its own wealth in comparison to those in its range of 
vision), when every agent is compared against every other, different structures emerge. These are dependent not just on the 
resource and its distribution in the world but also on the interplay of metabolism and vision. 
Adaptation - Individuals will move to a new site with greater resources than the one where they are currently location. 
Individual patrons can improve a location and distort the ‘natural’ patterns of resource growth.  
Sensing. – Agents know how much resource is available anywhere within their range of vision. They know the relative 
wealth of others within their vision. They know also the relative prestige of others within their vision. Patches know how many 
times they’ve been harvested, and whether or not they are still productive. 
Interaction. – Agents interact when they are in danger of using up all of their resources; patrons require support from 
their clients when the patron is competing for prestige against other patrons. Agents also act indirectly through the competition 
for resources at a particular location and the carrying capacity of that location. 
Stochasticity. – All processes are modelled as probabilities. 
Collectives. – Each agent, at the end of the model run, reports its patrons and its clients. These can then be knit together 
into a social network, whose characteristics can be explored statistically. Patrons call on their clients for support at certain 
times, drawing on the entire wealth of the group (and thus slowing down the patron’s generational turnover.) Individuals who 
are not part of a group exhibit selfish behaviour when harvesting, as they will not leave resource for others if the resource is in 
danger of being depleted. 
Initialization 
The world is torus-shaped. The environment is set to represent one of the four resources. Agents are distributed 
randomly across the world. Each agent is given a random life-span within the minimum and maximum amounts. Each agent is 
given a random metabolism within the maximum amount. Vision is similarly set. Each agent is initially given a random amount 
of resources around the maximum metabolism (so that they survive longer than the initial model cycle). Prestige and 
Generation are set to 1. 
Output 
At the end of the model run, each agent writes its patrons and clients into a single file for network analysis. The 
network analysis is performed using the Gephi network analysis program. 
Data on the state of the model at each time step is written to a spreadsheet, counting the number of agents who are 
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patrons, clients, their degree of prestige, and their classification into high-middle-low status both locally and globally. 
During the run itself, a Gini index of inequality and Lorenz Curve are calculated and displayed (a legacy of 
the original Wealth Distribution Model). 
 
 
